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RECENT PROGRESS IN JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION AND PROCEDURE
IN WISCONSIN
HoN. M&ARVIN

B.

ROSENBERRY,

Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
Wisconsin has of late often been referred to as the sociological
guinea-pig upon which various social experiments were tried out
for the benefit of humanity in general and other states in particular. Remarks of this character have emanated generally from
persons of statical disposition, whose equilibrium is disturbed by
a prospect of change. It is my firm conviction that Wisconsin,
because it has led in the enactment of remedial legislation, is a
better state today and in a better position to solve the problems
of reconstruction that all the states of this Union must face as the
result of the great upheaval through which we have just passed.
For one thing, we have the courage to go forward. Our wits
are not paralyzed by the thought of change. Our experience has
taught us that it is better to anticipate and prepare for needed
change rather than oppose it blindly. There was a large, earnest,
and sincere group of our citizens who fought many of the advances to the last ditch, but they would not do it again; not
even a respectable minority can be found who would advocate the
repeal of the enactments relating to the regulation of railroads
and public utilities, to compensation for industrial accidents, to
the establishment of the civil service, to the levying and collection of income and inheritance taxes, or in the main to other laws
relating to the public health, the conservation of our natural resources, and for the promotion of the public welfare generally.
There may be differences of opinion as to details and methods,
but the general principles embodied in our recent legislation are
acceptable to the great majority of our people.
In this general social advance of the last decade or two, the
courts of Wisconsin have played an important part. The work
of the courts has not been heralded by the blare of trumpets or
press-agented after the modern fashion. Because I did not participate in the decision of the cases having to do with the validity
or constitutionality of these laws, I feel free to say that the Court
met the great questions presented to it openmindedly, fully cognizant of its high duty and great responsibility.
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In 1911, having under consideration the Workmen's Compensation Act, Chief Justice Winslow, speaking for the Court, said:
"Constitutional commands and prohibitions, either distinctly laid down in express words or necessarily implied
from general words, must be obeyed, and implicitly obeyed,
so long as they remain unamended or unrepealed. Any other
course on the part of either legislator or judge constitutes
violation of his oath of office. But when there is no such
express command or prohibition, but only general language,
or a general policy drawn from the four corners of the instrument, what shall be said about this? By what standards
is this general language or general policy to be interpreted
and applied to present-day people and conditions?
"When an eighteenth century constitution forms the
charter of liberty of a twentieth century government, must
its general provisions be construed and interpreted by an
eighteenth century mind in the light of eighteenth century
conditions and ideals? Clearly not. This were to command
the race to halt in its progress, to stretch the state upon a
veritable bed of Procrustes." Borgnis vs. Falk Co., 147
Wis. 327, 349; 133 N. W. 2o9. See also Water Power
Cascs, 148 Wis. 124, 134 N. W. 33o; and Income Tax Cases,
148 Wis. 456, 134 N. W. 673, 135 N. W. 164.
While this language was thought by some to be open to misinterpretation, fairly construed it indicates the attitude of the
Court toward remedial legislation.
It has been said that in Wisconsin, which very early in its
history adopted the code, the code has been applied and interpreted more nearly in accord with its purpose and spirit than in
any other jurisdiction. In applying the provisions of the code
which provide that "In the construction of a pleading for the
purpose of determining its effect, its allegations shall be liberally
construed with a view to substantial justice between the parties" (Sec. 2668), and that "the court shall in every stage of an
action disregard any error or defect in the proceedings which
shall not affect the substantial rights of the adverse party; and
no judgment shall be reversed or affected by reason of such error
or defect" (Sec. 2989), the Supreme Court from an early day
(i858) discarded many of the refinements of common law pleading and practice, with the result that our procedure has been
gradually simplified, form has given way to substance, and mere
technical refinements are not permitted to thwart justice. Manning Vs. School District, 124 Wis. 84, 102 N. W. 356. For a
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time there was a tendency to adhere to some extent at least to
the old system, but it did not proceed far enough to substantially
mar the general result. While a lawyer trained in common law
pleading and practice groans at what he considers the confusion
and disorder of our practice, I have never heard it claimed that
it results in injustice to litigants.
So far as my knowledge e~ctends, there has never been any
controversy, between the courts of Wisconsin and its legislature
as to the precise boundaries which separate the exercise of judicial power from the exercise of legislative power. The subject
has received slight if any consideration, principally because there
has been no need for it. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis. 567. Much
of the progress attained under the influence of statutory amendments might have been attained by the adoption by the courts of
rules of practice. The courts" and the legislature have labored
together to accomplish the simplification of our procedure and
the expedition of judicial business.
Prior to 1913 considerable progress had been made. The legislature of that year adopted a resolution requesting the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin to suggest such changes "in the court practice of the state as will simplify it, relieve it of technicalities, and
promote the ends of justice, and to report their suggestions to
the legislature which convenes in 1915." Pursuant to that request
a number of amendments and modifications were suggested, on
which I shall touch in detail later.
Starting, then, with the code, liberally interpreted and sympathetically applied, experience nevertheless proved that certain
changes would be helpful and would promote the original object
and purpose of the code. It is these changes that I propose to
discuss briefly and in chronological order.
SPECIAL VERDICT.
Omission of Essential Fact Therefrom Shall be Deemed Determned By the Court in Conformity with its Judgment.
Since 1856 the statutes of Wisconsin have provided for the
taking of a special verdict either upon motion of a party, or in
the exercise of the discretion of the court upon its own motion.
By another statutory provision, there may be a special finding in
connection with the general verdict, but the special finding, if
inconsistent with the general verdict, controls. (Sec. 286o.)
Special verdicts were demanded in a great many cases. If a spe-

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

cial verdict omitted a finding as to any material issue of fact,
and judgment was rendered thereon, the failure to find as to such
material fact constituted reversible error, and a great many cases
were reversed on account of defective special verdicts. In many
of these cases it was perfectly apparent that had the proper questions been submitted to the jury, the jury would have found the
issuable fact in accordance with its other findings. In order to
remedy this situation the following statute was enacted:
Sec. 2858m. "Whenever any special verdict shall be
submitted to a jury and there is omitted therefrom some
controverted request but essential to sustain the judgment,
such matter of fact shall be deemed determined by the court
in comformity with its judgment and the neglect or omission
to request a finding by the jury on such matter shall be
deemed a waiver of a jury trial pro tanto and a consent that
such omitted fact be determined by the court. The finding
or determination of such omitted fact by the court may be
reviewed on appeal without any exception thereto." Act of
Legislature, Chapter 346, Laws of 1907.
The result of the enactment of this legislation has been that
comparatively few judgments have been reversed by reason of
the failure of the trial court to prepare and submit the proper
special verdict. Our experience under it has been entirely satisfactory, and new trials, with the consequent delay and expense,
have been avoided without detriment to the substantial rights of
the parties litigant.
This statute was first construed in Bratz vs. Stark, 138 Wis.
599, 12o N. W. 396. The latest reference to it is contained in
De Groot vs. Veldboom, 167 Wis. 107, 166 N. W. 662. The
section does not apply where there is no evidence which would
have warranted such a finding. Kraczek vs. The Falk Co., 142
Wis. 570, 126 N. W. 30. The section does not apply where there
was a proper request that the question be submitted upon a particular point. Habhegger vs. King, 149 Wis. I, 135 N. W. 166;
Murray vs. Paine Lumber Company, 155 Wis. 409, 144 N. W.
982.
Other Wisconsin cases construing and applying the statute
are: 140 Wis. 503, 122 N. W. 1O59; 14o Wis. 615, 123 N. W.
117; 141 Wis. 487, 124 N. W. 489; 142 Wis. 182, 125 N. W.
440; 142 Wis. 186, 125 N. W. 954; 142 Wis. 502, 125 N. W. 947;
142 Wis. 577, 126 N. W. 30; 143 Wis. 82, 126 N. W. 547; 143
Wis. 191, 122 N. W. 758, 126 N. W. 686; 146 Wis. 26, 13o N. W.
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132 N. W. 593; 147 Wis. 396, 132 N. W. 755;
133
N. W. 830; 148 Wis. 8I, 133 N. W. "'17;
448,
147 Wis.
148 Wis. i85, 134 N. W. 4oo; 149 Wis. I8, 135 N. W. 484; 149
Wis. 387, i35 N. W. 86o; 149 Wis. 627, 136 N. W. 822; 149 Wis.
66o, 135 N. W. 170; 151 Wis. 4o8, 139 N. W. i95; 152 Wis. 263,
139 N. W. 540; 152 Wis 551, I4O N. W. 305; 155 Wis. 189,
I44 N. W. 254;- I56 Wis. 229, '4S N. W. 970; 158 Wis. 188, I47
N. W. 1079; 16o Wis. 484, ,52 N. W. 187; I6o Wis. 668, 152
N. W. 416; 16I Wis. 422, 154 N. W. 694; 163 Wis. 17o, 157
N. W. 765; 163 Wis. 481, 147 N. W. 5IO; 164 Wis. 362, 159
N. W. 552; I66 Wis. 144, 164 N. W. 825Y 166 Wis. 315, 165

955; 147 Wis. 228,

N. W. 471; 166 Wis. 359, 164 N. W. 454.
NON-PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
While the provisions of Sec. 2829 "The court shall, in every
stage of an action, disregard any error or defect in the pleadings
or proceedings which shall not affect the substantial rights of the
adverse party; and no judgment shall be reversed or affected by
reason of such error or defect," has been in force since I856, the
court came gradually to the proposition that error was presumed
prejudicial. This was contrary to the letter as well as the spirit
of the code, and the court corrected its error. Oborn vs. State,
143 Wis. 249, 126 N. W. 737. Although legislation was not necessary, the situation was called to the attention of the legislature,
and the decisions of the court were practically codified by the
enactment of Chapter 192, Laws of ipo9, creating
Sec. 3072m. "No judgment shall be reversed or set
aside or new trial granted in any action or proceeding, civil
or criminal, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or
the improper admission of evidence, or for error as to any
matter or pleading or procedure, unless in the opinion of
the court to which the application is made, after an examination of the entire action or proceeding, it shall appear that
the error complained of has affected the substantial rights
of the party seeking to reverse or set aside the judgment,
or to secure a new trial."
The enactment of this section tended to direct anew the attention of the judiciary to the erroneous interpretation and the consequent misapplication of the code in certain particulars. Of the
statute the court said: "It was only intended to declare a public
policy as to such administration which it is the duty, as well as
the pleasure, of the court to conform to, so far as it reasonably
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promotes, or does not unreasonably interfere with, the exercise
of their constitutional jurisdiction." The enactment of the section had a revivifying effect, and Sec. 2829 supplemented by Sec.
3072m has been so construed that judgments are not now reversed on account of errors committed by the trial court, unless
it affirmatively appears upon an examination of the whole record
that such error has affected the substantial rights of the party
complaining. Berger vs. Abel & Bach Co., 141 Wis. 321, 124
N. W. 410. Whether or not the error complained of in a particular case has affected the substantial rights of the party complaining, is a matter of judicial determination under the facts and
circumstances of each case, and the practitioner is therefore without a definite guide as to when error will or will not be deemed
to be reversible error. The statute as enforced has operated so
satisfactorily that there has never been any demand for restrictive
legislation or any substantial complaint from the bar.
Under this section it has been held that a party cannot urge
as error the submission to the jury of an issue not presented by
the pleadings, if he made no objection thereto. Lewandowski vs.
McClintick-Marshall Construction Company, 155 Wis. 322, 143
N. W. lO63. Erroneous instruction as to the burden of proof
constitutes reversible error. Penn. Coal & Supply Co. vs. Schmidt,
155 Wis. 242, 144 N. W. 283. Where the trial court erroneously
withheld from consideration by the jury a severable part of plaintiff's complaint, this constituted immaterial or non-prejudicial
error where the jury found that the contract alleged to be the
basis of the entire claim was never entered into. Dalberg vs.
Jung Brewing Ca., 155 Wis. 185, 144 N. W. 198. Where the
damages assessed were in the opinion of the trial court and the
supreme court too large, it was held that the judgment might
be reversed for error which would have otherwise been regarded
as non-prejudicial. Nelson vs. Snoyenbos, 155 Wis. 59o, 145
N. W. 179. For a statement of error regarded as non-prejudicial
see Czapinski vs. Thomas Furnace Co., 158 Wis. 635, 149 N. W.
477. The exclusion of evidence which had only remote and inconsequential bearing upon the question at issue, not error. De
Pas vs. Southern Wisconsin R. R. Co., 159 Wis. 3o6, 15o N. W.
4o8. Where it does not appear that a different result would have
been reached, error in denying proper latitude in cross-examination held non-prejudicial. Greene vs. Agnew, i6o Wis. 224, 151
N. W. 268. E. Essley Machine Co. vs. First Trust Company,
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i6o Wis. 300, I51 N. W. 814; Murphy vs. Estate of Skinner, i6o
Wis. 554, 152 N. W. 172. Where upon the evidence the jury
could have failed to convict only by wantonly violating their
official oaths, error in instructions of court regarded as nonprejudicial. Ryan vs. State, 168 Wis. 14, 168 N. W. 566.
Other recent Wisconsin cases construing and applying the
section are: 153 Wis. 185, 14o N. W. io6o; 155 Wis. 75, 143
N. W. 1027; 155 Wis.. 557, 145 N. W. 227; 155 Wis. 599, 145
N. W. 225; 156 Wis. 36, 145 N. W. 2o7; 156 Wis. 399, 146 N. W.
481; I56 Wis. 449, 146 N. W. 5o6; 156 Wis. 588, 146 N. W. 782;
157 Wis. 292, 147 N. W. 36o; 158 Wis. 152, 147 N. W. 640,
148 N. W. 1O95; 158 Wis. 595, 149 N. W. 484; 159 Wis. 192,
149 N, W. 743; i6o Wis. 171, 151 N. W. 263; i6o Wis. 9, i50
N. W. 977; 163 Wis. 398, 158 N. W. 71; 164 Wis. 44, 159 N. W.
555; 164 Wis. 228, 159 N. W. 726; 165 Wis. 646, 163 N. W. 225;
166 Wis. 144, 164 N. W. 825; 166 Wis. 236, 165 N. W. 20; 166
Wis. 284, 164 N. W. 1007; 167 Wis. 584, 168 N. W. 390; 168
Wis. 145, 169 N. W. 3O; 168 Wis. 182, 169 N. W. 285; 169
Wis. 343, 172 N. W. 750; 169 Wis. 4o8, 172 N. W. 791.
DISCRETIONARY REVERSAL AND ENLARGEMENT OF
THE POWERS OF THE COURT TO DEAL WITH
MATTERS BEFORE IT BY APPEAL OR
ON WRIT OF ERROR.
In spite of the liberal provisions of the code there gradually
developed a technical practice, particulary in relation to the matter of objections and reservations of exceptions, and it happened
in many cases that reversals were necessary in order to correct
mere procedural errors. It also happened that by reason of the
failure of attorneys to make seasonable objections or seasonably
to file exceptions, the merits of a particular controversy could
not be fully considered. In order to meet this situation the following statute was enacted by Chapter 214, Laws of 1913:
SEc. 24o5nm
"In any action or proceeding brought to the
supreme court by appeal or writ of error, if it shall appear
to that court from the record, that the real controversy has
not been fully tried, or that it is probable that justice has
for any reason miscarried, the supreme court may in its
discretion reverse the judgment or order appealed from,
regardless of the question whether proper motions, objections, or exceptions appear in the record or not, and may
also, in case of reversal, direct the entry of the proper judg9
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ment or remit the case to the trial court for a new trial,
and direct the making of such amendments in the pleadings
and the adoption of such procedure in that court, not inconsistent with the statutes governing legal procedure, as
shall be deemed necessary to accomplish the ends of justice."
The first case in which this statute was applied illustrates not
only the need of the statute but the manner of its application. In
an action brought for damages for false representation two questions were submitted to the jury; first, as to the value of the land
actually conveyed, and second, as to the value of the lands shown
to the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court was of the opinion and the
trial court held that the transaction did not amount to a sale but
to a joint adventure. The question of whether or not the defendant, one of the parties to the transaction, had discharged his
duty, as a joint adventurer, to his colleagues, was not considered
or tried; no request was made that the issue be submitted to the
jury, and the point was not raised by the appellant in his brief on
appeal. The Supreme Court held that there were two questions
involved in the case; first, Was the defendant guilty of bad faith
in showing the plaintiffs the wrong piece of land; and second, if
not, then did he fail to exercise that degree of skill and diligence
in locating the land that a woodsman of his supposed skill and
experience ordinarily exercises under like circumstances? The
court held that the first question had been tried and decided, remanded the case for trial as to the second, upon the evidence then
in the record, and such further evidence as might be adduced by
the parties. Knudsen vs. George, 157 Wis.

520,

147 N. W. 1003.

Other cases applying and construing this section are: 159 Wis.
182, 149 N. W. 740; 159 Wis. 200, 149 N. W. 769; 159 Wis. 355,
15o N. W. 481; 159 Wis. 422, 15oN. W. 489; 159 Wis. 579, 15o
N. W. 987; i6o Wis. 205, 151 N. W. 256; 165 Wis. 554, 162 N. W.

664; 165 Wis. 569, 163 N. W. 173; I66 Wis. 144, 164 N. W. 285.

Pursuant to the resolution adopted by the legislature of I913
the Supreme Court made certain recommendations in its report
to the legislature of 1915. It would be a matter of considerable
interest to give the details relating to the report, the manner in
which it was received, and the progress through the legislature
of the legislation enacted pursuant to it, being Chap. 219, Laws
of 1915. The limited space, however, offers no opportunity for
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this, and I can only refer very briefly to the laws which eventuated from the joint labor of the court and the legislature.
JOINDER OF PARTIES.
Section 26o3 which contains the usual code provision that any
person may be made a defendant who has or claims an interest
adverse to the plaintiff or who is a necessary party to a complete
determination of the question involved, was amended by adding
thereto,
"A plaintiff may join as defendants persons against
whom the right to relief is alleged to exist in the alternative,
although recovery against one may be inconsistent with recovery against the other; and in all such actions the recovery
of costs by any of the parties to the action shall be in the
discretion of the court."
This provision has been applied in but one case, Williams vs.
Thrall, 167 Wis. 41o, 167 N. W. 825, so far as the records of the
Supreme Court show. It has had, however, a wide application in
the circuit court, and operates to prevent miscarriage of justice
in cases where the plaintiff, although entitled in law and fact to
recover against one of two parties, may by reason of the inconsistency of juries be defeated upon different trials as to both.
INTERPLEADER OF PERSONS LIABLE TO
DEFENDANT.
Section 261o Wis. Stats. relating to interpleader was amended
by adding thereto the following:
"A defendant who shows by affidavit that if he be held
liable in the action he will have a right of action against a
third person not a party to the action for the amount of the
recovery against him, may, upon due notice to such person
and to the opposing party, apply to the court for an order
making such third person a party defendant in order that
the rights of all parties may be finally settled in one action,
and the court may in its discretion make such order. This
section shall be liberally construed in order that, so far as
practicable, all closely related contentions may be disposed
of in one action, even though in the strict sense there be
two controversies, provided the contentions relate to the
same general subject and separate actions would subject
either of the parties to the danger of double liability of
serious hardship."
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While under the provisions of this section there may be in
effect in one action a double complairit (Lumbermen's National
Bank vs. Corrigan, 167 Wis. 82, 166 N. W. 65o), even that does
not operate to prevent the application of the statute. Since the
decision in Ellis vs. Chicago & Northwestern R. R. Co., 167 Wis.
392, 167 N. W. lO48, holding that there may be contribution between joint tort f easors, in certain cases, rather interesting situations have presented themselves under the provisions of this
statute. In Bakulca vs. Schwab, 167 Wis. 546, 168 N. W. 378, it
was held that in an action against independent tort feasors whose
concurring wrongful acts caused the injury, a judgment in favor
of one of the defendants but in plaintiff's favor as against the
other, is not res adjudicataupon the question of the liability of
the defendants to the plaintiff in a subsequent action for contribution between the defendants, on the ground that such a case
is not within the reason of the rule upon which the doctrine of
res adjudicatais founded.
The right of trial by jury raises some interesting phases of
this statute. In Miley vs. Heaney, 163 Wis. 134, 140, 157 N. W.
515, it was held that the practice of pleading by cross complaint

and the bringing in of all parties would operate to deprive parties of the right of jury trial in certain instances. It was held,
however, that if a jury issue was presented, the court should in
its discretion direct that issue to be first tried, and that the section
was not open to criticism on that ground.
The section has also been considered in the following cases:
129 Wis. 511, 1O9 N. W. 558; 130 Wis. 475, 1io N. W. 483;
131
139
140
143
152
154

Wis. 378, III N. W. 478; 134 Wis. 490, 115 N. W. 138;
Wis. 401, 121 N. W. 150; 140 Wis. 287, 122 N. W. 761;
Wis. 318, 122 N. W. 730; 141 Wis. 375, 122 N. W. 1023;
Wis. 622, 128 N. W. 425; 151 Wis. 269, 138 N. W. 637, 769;
Wis. 439, 139 N. W. 1129; 154 Wis. 479, 143 N. W. 162;
Wis. 627, 143 N. W. 668; 158 Wis. 312, 149 N. W. 32;

162 Wis. 361, 156 N. W. ioii; 163 Wis. 357, 158 N. W. 85;
164 Wis. 380, i6o N. W. 263; 166 Wis. 347, 165 N. W. 382;
167 Wis. 417, 167 N. W. 825; 168 Wis. 557, 17o N. W. 951.

JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION.
Section 2647 Wis. Stats. was amended by striking out the
limitations as to joinder of several causes of action, so that as
amended the section now reads:
12
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"The plaintiff may unite in the same complaint several
causes of action, whether they be such as were formerly
denominated legal or equitable or both. But the causes of
action so united must affect all the parties to the action and
not require different places of trial, and must be stated
separately."
This struck out of the section seven provisions enumerating
the conditions under which causes of action might be joined,
leaving the section as broad as language can make it. The causes
of action need no longer relate to the same transaction or to
transactions connected with the subject of the action, nor arise
out of contract express or implied, or from injury with or without force to person or property or both. Any cause of action,
provided it affects all the parties to the action, and does not require a different place of trial, may be joined. This section has
been interpreted in Ehlers vs. Automobile Liability Company, 166
Wis. 185, 164 N. W. 845, where it was held that an indemnitor
might be joined in a suit brought against a person for injury
caused by the negligent operation of an automobile. And in
Midland Terra Cotta Company vs. Illinois Surety Company, 163
Wis. 190, 157 N. W. 785, it was held that a cause of action
against a building contractor for the amount due for materials
purchased, and against the owner on his express promise to pay
therefor if plaintiff would forego a lien, could not properly be
joined with a cause of action for the same debt against the contractor and against the surety company which was liable on the
contractor's bond. See also 159 Wis. 39, 15o N. W. 411.
WAIVER OF DEFECTS ON APPEAL.
I shall refer only briefly to Section 2836a, which provides that
whenever an appeal is attempted to be taken, and a return upon
the appeal shall have been made, the respondent shall be deemed
to have waived all objections to the regularity or sufficiency of
the appeal or to the jurisdiction of the appellate court over persons or subject matter, if he does not make seasonable objection
by motion before participating in any proceeding in the hppellate court. It further provides that upon the hearing of a motion
to dismiss, the court shall have power to allow any defect or
omission in the notice, undertaking, or other appeal papers to be
supplied, and in the event that it shall appear that the court from
which the appeal was taken had no jurisdiction of the subject
13
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matter, the appellate court shall remand the case to the proper
tribunal, where it shall proceed as if originally begun there, and
that in all cases, in every court, where objection to the jurisdiction of the court is sustained, the cause shall be certified to the
proper court, provided that it appear that the error arose from a
bona fide mistake and not from design.
Under this section an application to the Supreme Court for
the exercise of its original jurisdiction was denied but the cause
was remanded to the circuit court of the proper county. State
ex rel. Johnson vs. County Boards, 165 Wis. 164, 161 N. W. 356.
In Dring vs. Mainwaring, 165 Wis. 356, 162 N. W. 171, where
it appeared that the trial court was without jurisdiction of the
subject matter, on appeal to the Supreme Court the cause was
remanded to the trial court with drections to remit the record to
the court having jurisdiction. This case was again before the
Supreme Court in 168 Wis. 139, 169 N. W. 301; and the opinion
on the second appeal recites in detail how the law was administered.
See also: 161 Wis. 6o5, 155 N. W. 142; 162 Wis. 95, 155 N. W.
954; 169 Wis. 238, 171 N. W. 956.
MISTAKEN REMEDY OR ACTION
The constitution of the state of Wisconsin declares, in common with the constitutions of many other states that "every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the law for all injury or
wrong which he may receive in his person, property, or character." One of the inherent defects of the old system was the
uncertainty as to the form of remedy for the redress of a particular wrong. While the different remedies were theoretically
adequate, in actual practice the suitor was often in doubt as to
the particular remedy which should be invoked in a given instance. One of the objects of the code was to simplify procedure
in this respect, and the code accordingly declared that all remedies
were divided into, first, Actions, and second, Special Proceedings;
and while the distinction between suits at law and in equity were
abolished and but one form of action provided, the adherence to
long established principles resulted in many litigants being denied their rights by reason of technical insufficiency of their
pleadings when tested according to common law principles. Had
the code in this particular been applied as liberally from the beginning as it was generally, such results would have been largely
14
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avoided. To meet this situation the Supreme Court proposed the
adoption of Section 2836b. Because it is the most far-reaching
of all the amendments, and because it is impossible to restate it
in a more condensed form, I state it in extenso.
SEC. 2836b. "In all cases where upon objection taken
or upon demurrer sustained or after trial it shall appear
to the court that any party claiming affirmative relief or
damages has mistaken his remedy, his action, proceeding,
cross complaint, counterclaim, writ, or relation shall not be
finally dismissed or quashed, but costs shall be awarded
against him and he shall be allowed a reasonable time within
which to amend and the amended action or proceeding shall
continue in that court except in case that court has no jurisdiction to grant the relief sought, in which case the action
in whole or in such divisible part in which jurisdiction is
lacking shall be certified to some other court which has
jurisdiction. Amendments may be made changing any action from one on contract to one in tort, and vice versa,
from one at law to one in equity and vice versa, from a
special proceeding or action under or pursuant to any writ
to any action and vice versa. The judgment in all cases of
mistaken remedy shall be repondeat ouster and for costs,
the latter in the discretion of the court, but with leave to
amend and proceed in that court or some other designated
court; or part in that court and part in some other court in
one of several actions or proceedings as justice may require."
Speaking of this section, Chief Justice Winslow said:
"The beneficient effect of this provision can hardly be
overestimated. It means that it will no longer be necssary
to kick the plaintiff out of the back door of the courtroom
(with costs) in order that he may re-enter by the front door
in a different garb. It means that we are losing interest in
the mere niceties of procedure and gaining interest in the
accomplishment of justice 'completely and without denial,
promptly and without delay'." Jilek vs. Zahl, 162 Wis. 157,
155 N. W. 9o9.
Other Wisconsin cases referring to this statute are: 162 Wis.
340, i56 N. W. 14o; 162 Wis. 482, 156 N. W. 477; 163 Wis. 436,
158 N. W. 254; 164 Wis. 255, 159 N. W. 912; 165 Wis. 450, i6o
N. W. 156; 165 Wis. 97, 16i N. W. 367; 165 Wis. 529, 162 N. W.
916; 166 Wis. 593, 166 N. W. 326; 167 Wis. 417, 167 N. W. 822;
i68 Wis. 139, 169 N. W. 3o1; i68 Wis. 534, 7i N. W. 54; 168
Wis. 562, 17o N. W. 951.
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WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL BY MOTION TO
DIRECT VERDICT.
Reference has already been made to Section 2858m, governing procedure in cases where a special verdict was demanded.
Under the practice existing in Wisconsin it was not an infrequent thing for each party at the close of the evidence to move
the court to direct a verdict in his favor. Such double motions
put upon the trial court the burden of making a correct determination, as the opposite party would have a right of review upon
appeal, and if it should turn out, as it often did, that there was
a jury question as to one of the litigated issues, the court was
likely to fall into error. To remedy this situation the Supreme
Court suggested, in accordance with the practice in the federal
courts and in the courts of some other states, the enactment of
Section 2857a, by which it is provided that in a jury trial, when
each party shall without reservation move the court to direct a
verdict, such motion shall be considerel as equivalent to a stipulation by the parties, waiving a jury and submitting the entire case
to the court for decision upon the facts as well as the law. This
section has only been twice before the Supreme Court, and in
neither case was its application questioned, nor was there any
call for a construction of the statute, if indeed any construction
is possible. Where, at the close of the evidence, the plaintiff
moved to dismiss the defendant's counter-claim, and the defendant moved for judgment in its behalf, and the dismissal of the
counter-claim would have resulted necessarily in a judgment for
the plaintiff, it was held under this section that such motions constituted a waiver of a jury trial, and a submission to the court
for its decision of the entire case. Ott vs. Cream City Sand Conpany, 166 Wis. 228, 164 N. W. lOO5. See also Jones vs. Citizens'
Savings & Trust Company, 168 Wis. 646, 171 N. W. 648.
I shall not refer to that part of Chapter 219 of the Laws of
1915 relating to costs, as it covers matters which are not of general interest.
ALL PARTIES BROUGHT UP ON APPEAL; MOTION
FOR REVIEW BY RESPONDENT.
The last provision of Chapter 219 of the Laws of 1915 to which
I shall make reference is that creating Section 3049a. While
this statute has not been before the court for consideration, it has
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been applied in a large number of cases in practice. Under its
provisions parties who are jointly or severally bound by judgment
must, in case an appeal is taken by one party, within thirty days
take their appeal or their right of appeal is deemed to be waived.
It authorizes the Supreme Court at any time after an appeal is
taken to bring in additional parties upon its own motion or upon
application of one of the original parties; and it also provides
that upon an appeal a respondent may have a review of the rulings
of which he complains, by serving upon the appellant at any time
before the case is set down for hearing in the Supreme Court, a
notice stating in what respect he asks for a review, reversal, or
modification of any part of the judgment appealed from. Such
notice, under the provisions of Sec. 3o49 a in practical effect operates as a cross appeal. Birdsong & Company vs. Marty, 163 Wis.
516, 158 N. W. 289.
Other Wisconsin cases as follows: 162 Wis. 212, 155 N. W.
128; 164 Wis. 33, 159 N. W. 577; 164 Wis. 510, 159 N. W. 750;
168 Wis. 145, 169 N. W. 3O1; 169 Wis. 135, 17o N. W. 822
DECLARATORY RELIEF.
The most recent amendment to our procedural law is Section
2687m:
"Equitable actions to obtain declaratory relief may be
brought and maintained in the circuit court and in matters of
which the supreme court has original jurisdiction in the supreme court, and it shall be no objection to the maintenance
of such an action that no consequential relief is sought or
can be granted if it appears that substantial doubt or controversy exists as to the rights or duties of parties, and that
neither public or private interests will be materially promoted by a declaration of the right or duty in advance of
any actual or threatened invasion or right or default in
duty. The judgment rendered in such an action shall bind
all the parties thereto and be conclusive and final as to the
rights and duties involved." Chapt. 242, Laws 1919.
No case has yet arisen under this law. The purpose of the law
is plain. To what extent it may be resorted to no one may say.
The history of this legislation, together with a statement of its
objects and purposes is found in an article by Justice A. J. Vinje,
4 Marquette Law Review, p. Io6 (April, 1920).
17

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

Statutes of themselves can accomplish little, and unless legislative enactments reflect the sentiment of the bench and the bar,
they fail in a large degree to accomplish their purpose. The significant thing in relation to the progress of judicial procedure in
Wisconsin is that it has come about largely through the initiative
of judges and the leading members of the bar. The real situation
is not fairly indicated by reference to legislative enactments or
reported decisions. A large factor in our progress has been the
attitude of the bar toward our remedial legislation. Lawyers are
less and less insistent upon mere technical practices, and more
and more concerned with the trial of their causes upon their
merits. Thirty years ago forty per cent of the questions treated
in the opinions of the Supreme Court were practice questions;
now not over twenty per cent of the questions treated relate to
practice, despite the fact that there have been many changes in
procedural matters. The public has rightly become very impatient over needless procedural delays. The duty of the bench and
bar in this respect cannot be too often emphasized. It was most
forcefully presented by Hon. Elihu Root at Chicago in 1916.
The conditions of which he spoke somewhat in prospect then are
now largely realities. We should endeavor more and more to approach the ideal outlined by Mr. Root (Address Am. Bar Asso.,
1914), when a controversy in -court will be shorn largely of its
technicalities, and resemble more nearly the effort of one neighbor to settle a dispute between two other neighbors. We in Wisconsin believe that it can be done and an orderly administration
of the law in accordance with fundamental principles of justice
still be maintained. If our efforts and experience contribute to
real progress in judicial administration and procedure, it will
bring to us added satisfaction.
25,

(Address read before Judicial Section, American Association, July
1920.)

